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Here we present a theory of human trauma and chronic stress, based on the practice of
Somatic Experiencing® (SE), a form of trauma therapy that emphasizes guiding the client’s
attention to interoceptive, kinesthetic, and proprioceptive experience. SE™ claims that this
style of inner attention, in addition to the use of kinesthetic and interoceptive imagery,
can lead to the resolution of symptoms resulting from chronic and traumatic stress. This
is accomplished through the completion of thwarted, biologically based, self-protective
and defensive responses, and the discharge and regulation of excess autonomic arousal.
We present this theory through a composite case study of SE treatment; based on this
example, we offer a possible neurophysiological rationale for the mechanisms involved,
including a theory of trauma and chronic stress as a functional dysregulation of the
complex dynamical system formed by the subcortical autonomic, limbic, motor and arousal
systems, which we term the core response network (CRN). We demonstrate how the
methods of SE help restore functionality to the CRN, and we emphasize the importance
of taking into account the instinctive, bodily based protective reactions when dealing
with stress and trauma, as well as the effectiveness of using attention to interoceptive,
proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensation as a therapeutic tool. Finally, we point out that SE
and similar somatic approaches offer a supplement to cognitive and exposure therapies,
and that mechanisms similar to those discussed in the paper may also be involved in the
benefits of meditation and other somatic practices.
Keywords: trauma, stress, interoception, meditation, somatic experiencing, autonomic nervous system, premotor
system, core response network
INTRODUCTION
SE is a novel form of therapy, developed by Levine (1977, 1997,
2010) over the past 45 years. It focuses on resolving the symptoms
of chronic stress and post-traumatic stress. SE differs from cog-
nitive therapies in that its major interventional strategy involves
bottom-up processing by directing the client’s attention to inter-
nal sensations, both visceral (interoception) and musculo-skeletal
(proprioception and kinesthesis), rather than primarily cogni-
tive or emotional experiences. SE is not a form of exposure
therapy; it specifically avoids direct and intense evocation of
traumatic memories, instead approaching the charged memories
indirectly and very gradually, as well as facilitating the generation
of new corrective interoceptive experiences that physically contra-
dict those of overwhelm and helplessness. Why this is an effective
approach is the core theme of this paper.
SE shares this focus on internal awareness with traditional
methods of meditative movement, such as Yoga, T’ai Chi
and Qigong, as well as many forms of seated meditation
(Schmalzl et al., 2014). Less well-known Western-grown
therapeutic (“Somatic”) systems such as the Alexander
Technique (Stuart, 2013), the Feldenkrais method (Feldenkrais,
2005), and Continuum (Conrad-Da’oud and Hunt, 2007),
also use this general approach. The explanations and
suggestions in this paper apply to some extent to all of these
systems.
We believe that the sophisticated and precise theories and tech-
niques of SE offer a way of understanding the processes that
occur during mindfulness meditation, both the beneficial men-
tal, emotional and physiological effects of mindfulness meditation
and the flooding or dissociation that can occur when traumatic
memories surface. In addition, SE can suggest ways in which
mindfulness meditation practices could be modified to enable
meditators to process traumatic material, and traumatized peo-
ple to use mindfulness-based techniques to help them recover. At
the end of the paper we will elaborate on these ideas.
Over the past 15 years there has been a rapid increase in
research on interoception, its relation to the insular and anterior
cingulate cortices, and its relevance to the sense of self, cogni-
tion, and psychiatric disorders. Craig (2002) and Critchley et al.
(2004) have both clarified the efferent and afferent pathways link-
ing the organs to the cortex; Damasio (2003) and Craig (2010)
have each suggested a link between sense of self and interoceptive
awareness; Damasio, in his theory of somatic markers (Damasio
et al., 1996), has suggested interoception is involved in cogni-
tion and decision-making. Clear links have been found between
compromised interoceptive function and psychiatric disorders,
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including depression (Avery et al., 2013), anxiety (Paulus and
Stein, 2010) and addiction (May et al., 2014). Mindfulness medi-
tation practices have been shown to improve insular functioning
and connectivity (Holzel et al., 2011) and to increase interocep-
tion (Farb et al., 2013), and insular function has been linked with
increased empathy (Singer et al., 2009). Very little research has as
yet explored the therapeutic utility of attending to interoception;
however see MacDonald (2007) and Price et al. (2007, 2012a).
At this point we are not aware of any published peer reviewed
studies of SE, neither case studies, clinical trials, nor tests of its
mechanisms. While a number of studies are currently under-
way, more research into SE and its methods and mechanisms are
needed. We hope the present paper will demonstrate the possibil-
ities involved in active and structured attention to interoceptive
and proprioceptive experience.
We will present a case study of the treatment of a client by
SE; this is a composite case, with illustrative episodes drawn from
several different cases in the authors’ files. The first-person per-
spective used for convenience during the narrative, also reflects a
composite practitioner. We are using this composite case format
as a way of succinctly presenting and illustrating the core ideas
of SE. Although the interactions are derived from actual clini-
cal experience, bias could be present in the authors’ selection of
which examples to include. We do not present the case study as
constituting evidence for any hypotheses, either concerning SE or
other neurophysiological theories discussed.
After each case episode, we will discuss our perspective on
the neurophysiology of the events and interventions. The case we
present is of post-traumatic stress and pain symptoms following
a car accident in which the client was not physically injured but
came very close to being killed. This is an example of a relatively
uncomplicated kind of trauma: an isolated event, happening to
an adult, with no significant complex relational or developmental
issues involved and no significant physical damage to the body or
brain.
CASE HISTORY
The following information is from an extensive pre-session ques-
tionnaire Simon was asked to complete before his first meeting
with me: Simon is 43 years old man, married with two adult
children; he is a middle-level manager at a supermarket chain,
normally a competent and well-organized man. Four months ago
he was in a car accident: he was driving home from work in
the late afternoon at 75 mph on an Interstate highway when a
tractor trailer went out of control just ahead of him, colliding
with several other cars. He was convinced that he was going to
die; but after sideswiping a couple of cars he ended up in the
breakdown lane. Apart from a few minor bruises he reported
being unhurt; his air-bag went off and he was wearing his seat
belt. He was, however, taken to a local emergency room for an
examination.
On arriving home that evening, he felt very shaken and teary,
but pushed away the impulse to cry and told himself that he
should “pull himself together.” The next morning he woke up feel-
ing depressed and anxious, and was unable to organize himself to
rent a car and get to work. He became angry with himself. The
following day he managed to rent a car and as he began driving
to work, he had a panic attack before getting onto the Interstate.
He was able to get to work by the back roads, but found himself
unable to concentrate at work.
Over the following 4 months he continued to feel “not him-
self”; he alternated periods of depression and anxiety with bouts
of extreme irritability and outbursts of anger, all of which had a
negative impact on his work and his marriage. He describes hav-
ing chronically cold hands and feet, a pounding heart, a knot in
his stomach and a fuzzy feeling in his head. Also he notes that
whenever he is outside, he has a tendency to be hyper-focused
on passing traffic to the point of being distracted from what he
is doing. After 2 months, at his wife’s urging, he went to see a
therapist, but got extremely angry at what he described as the
therapist’s implication that it was “all in his head.” He says that he
knows he should not be reacting this way, that it is not rational,
that after all “nothing really happened to him,” but feels com-
pletely powerless to change how he feels. Through a friend he
heard about Somatic Experiencing, and on being assured it was
“not talk therapy,” he decided to give it a try.
DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY
AUTONOMIC NERVOUS SYSTEM
When discussing the autonomic nervous system (ANS), pio-
neering researcher and Nobel prize winner in physiology and
medicine, Hess (1925) as well as early researcher Gellhorn (1970)
used the terms “ergotropic” (energy seeking) and “trophotropic”
(nutrition seeking) to point out that the two principal branches of
the ANS cannot be isolated from the somatic and central nervous
systems and the neuroendocrine system. The ergotropic system
includes activation of the sympathetic nervous system as well as
the motor and premotor system (increased muscle tension and
preparedness to act), the endocrine system (increased secretions
of a number of stress hormones), and the central nervous sys-
tem (increased sensory alertness), in a coordinated preparation
for strong energy expenditure (“fight or flight”). In contrast, the
trophotropic system involves these same systems in a prepara-
tion for rest, feeding and recuperation. This recognition of an
integrated response of the whole nervous system, especially the
integration of the autonomic and somatic systems, is central to
our thesis.
THE “CORE RESPONSE NETWORK” (CRN)
Unlike conventional psychotherapy which focuses largely on ver-
bal cognitive processes, the focus of SE is on the functioning of
the deeper, regulatory, levels of the nervous system, in particular
the autonomic nervous system (ANS); the emotional motor sys-
tem (EMS) (Holstege et al., 1996); the reticular arousal systems
(RAS) (Krout et al., 2002; Strominger et al., 2012); and the limbic
system (LS) (Heimer and Van Hoesen, 2006); these four subcor-
tical structures form what we term the core response network; see
Figure 1.
There is extensive evidence that these four networks inter-
act strongly (Gellhorn, 1970; Weinberg and Hunt, 1976; Hamm
et al., 2003; Critchley, 2005, 2013; Thompson, 2005; Coombes
et al., 2006; Hajcak et al., 2007; Sze et al., 2010; Kim et al., 2011;
Herbert and Pollatos, 2012; Price et al., 2012b; Norman et al.,
2014). The ANS can intensify or calm the activity of the viscera,
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FIGURE 1 | The Core Response Network (CRN). The CRN organizes
immediate, instinctive response to environmental challenges, prior to
extensive cortical processing. It includes the autonomic nervous system
(hypothalamus), the limbic emotional system (amygdala, hippocampus,
septal region), the emotional motor system (portions of the basal ganglia,
red nucleus, periaqueductal gray), and the reticular arousal systems. All
these systems interact strongly through multiple feed-back and
feed-forward connections, forming a complex dynamical system which can
enter various discrete functional and dysfunctional states.
alter blood circulation, trigger hormonal and endocrine activity,
change muscle tone, increase or decrease cognitive arousal, and
contribute to emotional experience (Norman et al., 2014).
The LS, including amygdala, hippocampus, and septal regions,
is central to fear- and pleasure-based experience and to the recall
of emotional significance (Heimer and Van Hoesen, 2006). This
network has strong bi-directional links to the ANS (Uylings
et al., 1999), and the RAS (Strominger et al., 2012), and trig-
gers emotion-specific movement and posture via the EMS (De
Gelder, 2006). The RAS involves multiple networks which trigger
arousal through several different pathways. It controls alertness
and orientation in different contexts, and interfaces strongly with
LS, ANS and EMS (Krout et al., 2002; Berntson and Cacioppo,
2007). The EMS involves multiple subcortical motor centers
[striatum, red nucleus, periaqueductal gray (PAG)] which are
involved in emotion-specific movements and postures which can
occur outside voluntary cortical control. It is primarily extra-
pyramidal. It is strongly influenced by ANS, LS and RAS, and
provides important kinesthetic and proprioceptive feedback to
them (Holstege et al., 1996; Holstege, 2013). The CRN responds
very quickly to arousing or threatening stimuli, with little input
from higher cortical evaluative processes (Porges’ “neuroception”
Porges, 2004).
This view is very similar to Panksepp’s concept of the core
self (Panksepp, 1998): a network of largely subcortical structures,
centered on the PAG, which are responsible for primal affective
experiences and their concomitant motor response organization.
We also note the similarity to Damasio’s concept of the “proto-
self” (Damasio, 2003) and Schore’s “implicit self” (Schore, 2011).
SE views this core system as the primary target for the treatment
of stress and trauma.
CORTICAL AREAS INVOLVED IN SE
We suggest that SE works by restoring optimal function to
this network by way of the interoceptive (insula/anterior cingu-
late) and premotor cortices (Critchley et al., 2003; Craig, 2009).
Although words are used in the process of SE therapy, they are
used to point to and elicit non-verbal experiences of internal
bodily sensation (interoception), sense of position and orien-
tation (proprioception), sensations of movement (kinesthesis),
and spatial sense. These are mediated respectively by the insular
and anterior cingulate gyrus (Critchley et al., 2003), the pre-
motor cortex (Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009), the parietal cortex
(Bartolomeo, 2006; Briscoe, 2009), as well as by the orbitofrontal
cortex (Roy et al., 2012). All these areas have very rich and direct
communication with the subcortical networks mentioned above,
and SE views them as the basis for voluntary intervention on the
dysregulated subcortical networks; see Figure 2.
STRESS
Since its first use in physiology, the word “stress” has been sub-
ject to multiple definitions and interpretations and the word is
often used imprecisely. Hans Selye acknowledged his poor com-
mand of English as responsible for a use at odds with that of
physics, where “stress” refers to the force acting on an object and
“strain” to the resulting distortion; Selye used the word to refer
to the response of the organism, and the word “stressor” came
to be used for the impacting situation (Rosch, 1986). Stressors
may broadly be divided into biological, where the stressor has an
unambiguous physical and physiological effect on the organism;
and psycho-social, where the effect of the stressor is determined
by the interpretation the organism makes of the external situa-
tion (Everly and Lating, 2013). Using the same word “stress” to
describe the organism’s response to these very different categories
of events is justified by Walter Cannon’s concept of the “stress
response” (Cannon, 1970), a supposedly unitary response of the
organism to any stressor regardless of its nature.
This early approach led to several difficulties, which have been
pointed out by many authors (Levine, 1977, 1986; Lupien et al.,
2006; Berntson and Cacioppo, 2007; McEwen and Wingfield,
2010; McVicar, 2013): first, although certain psycho-social situ-
ations may be referred to as “stressors,” the event can only be so
defined in relation to the response of a specific organism, render-
ing the definition meaningless (it no longer makes sense to assert
that a certain situation “is a stressor” in any absolute or general-
ized sense). Second, the division into physical and psycho-social
stressors neglects the fact that the general state of the organ-
ism influences its response to every kind of event, not merely
psycho-social events (Vosselman et al., 2014). Some individuals
have conclusively demonstrated voluntary (Kox, 2012) and teach-
able (Kox et al., 2014) control over functions usually believed to
be purely “physiological,” such as sympathetic thermogenesis and
inflammatory immune responses. The division into physiologi-
cal and psycho-social is a legacy of the now outmoded Cartesian
mind-body separation. Third, current research demonstrates that
even the response of the autonomic nervous system to sim-
ple physical stressors (pain, temperature, thirst. . . ) is extremely
nuanced and individually variable (Saper, 2002), and cannot be
summed up as unitary “stress response.” In an effort to resolve
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 93 | 3
Payne et al. Somatic experiencing: interoceptive trauma therapy
FIGURE 2 | Cortical control of the CRN. We suggest that the influence of
conscious conceptual thought processes on the CRN is relatively weak and
indirect, whereas the influence of those portions of the cortex mediating
interoceptive, proprioceptive and kinesthetic awareness is relatively strong
and direct. These areas include the insula and anterior cingulate cortex, which
have been hypothesized to be involved in cortical control of the ANS; and the
sensorimotor and (especially) pre-motor cortex, involved in kinesthetic and
proprioceptive experience and in planning and imagining movement, as well
as the parietal cortex involved in body schema, and the ventro-medial
prefrontal cortex.
these issues, attempts were made to define “good stress” and “bad
stress” (Selye, 1975), adding awkward and unwieldy concepts to
the mix (Levine, 1986).
Although current views of stress emphasize the role of cog-
nitive appraisal of the stress-inducing situation, recent writers
(Porges, 2004; Cohen, 2014) have pointed out that emotionally
charged and sudden situations are responded to very rapidly at
a sub-cortical level, involving the amygdalar complex and the
hippocampus, and not initially engaging the complex associa-
tive cortex with its capacity for reasoned decision. In fact much
psychological research (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999; Chaiken and
Trope, 1999; Cohen, 2014) demonstrates that even apparently
rational thought processes are strongly influenced by emotional
states. Conscious thought and unconscious emotional processes
influence each other reciprocally, it is not a one-way street.
Emotional processes equally influence the physical state at the
pre-motor level; reciprocally, the state of the body frames the
emotional response.
Since the 1920s, ideas about the functioning of the ANS
have evolved from a simple homeostatic linear reciprocal system
(Cannon, 1929; Selye, 1954), through concepts of homeody-
namics and allostasis (McEwen and Wingfield, 2003; Berntson
and Cacioppo, 2007) to the current framework of an allody-
namic system, capable of very complex self-regulatory behavior
involving feed-back and feed-forward loops and integration with
rostral brain centers (Berntson and Cacioppo, 2007). Predating
many of these developments, Levine, in his 1977 Ph.D. thesis
(Levine, 1977), suggests that the ANS (and related subcortical
structures) form a complex dynamical system (CDS) (Abraham
et al., 1990, 1992). He acknowledges Gellhorn’s seminal discovery
that, although under normal circumstances the sympathetic and
parasympathetic (or ergotropic and trophotropic) systems main-
tain a reciprocal relationship and return to baseline after distur-
bance (see Figure 3), following even moderately intense distur-
bance they can become “tuned” (Gellhorn, 1967a), chronically
biased in one direction, and can fail to return to baseline; see
Figure 4. In Gellhorn’s experiments, rats subjected to stressful
stimuli below a certain threshold demonstrated temporary eleva-
tion in sympathetic activation and diminished parasympathetic
tone, followed by a spontaneous return to baseline levels; however
if the stimulus exceeded a certain level of intensity or duration,
the ANS did not return to baseline and the rats remained in a
chronic state of elevated sympathetic and depressed parasympa-
thetic activity (Gellhorn, 1967a).
Under extreme and inescapable stress, the ANS may start
to respond in paradoxical ways, and even manifest simultane-
ous extreme activation of both sympathetic and parasympathetic
branches (Gellhorn, 1964a, 1968). Working with anesthetized
cats, Gellhorn clamped the trachea, inducing suffocation. There
was an initial extreme rise in sympathetic arousal, followed by
an even greater co-activation of the parasympathetic system.
This phenomenon has been verified by other researchers (Paton
et al., 2006), and is believed to underlie the well-recognized phe-
nomenon of “tonic immobility” (Nijenhuis et al., 1998a; Marx
et al., 2008), which is known to occur in both animals and
humans under conditions of extreme stress. Gellhorn’s animal
experiments clearly demonstrate this unexpected behavior of the
ANS (Gellhorn, 1970), and Levine clarifies the clinical implica-
tions of this phenomenon (Levine, 1977). Levine demonstrates
the use of the mathematics of catastrophe theory (Thom, 1989) to
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FIGURE 3 | Acute (mild) stress response. In response to a mild stressor
the ANS (and the whole CRN) responds with sympathetic activation,
accompanied by a reciprocal lessening of vagal (parasympathetic) tone.
Usually this activation will support an appropriate response to the stressor;
this response will be accompanied by proprioceptive feedback that the
response has been successfully completed. Sympathetic activation then
diminishes, vagal tone returns to normal, and the whole CRN resets to
normal resilient functioning.
explicate and predict the behavior of the ANS under extreme con-
ditions, and relates this model to clinical approaches to treating
PTSD and related conditions.
“Stress,” in the sense of an undesirable state, is defined by
Levine as the inability of the complex dynamical system of the ANS
to recover to normal functionality (Levine, 1977, 1986). This is
distinct from the current concept of allostatic load in describ-
ing stress. Allostatic load refers to the complex neurological
and endocrine changes (“wear and tear”) that result from hav-
ing to make continual adaptations to environmental challenges
(McEwen and Wingfield, 2003), but leave the exact nature of the
stress response itself still undefined. The “wear and tear” is the
effect of the stressed condition, and it may lead to circular patterns
of perpetuated disruption of normal functioning (Juster et al.,
2010). However Levine’s approach suggests that to be “stuck”
in a “stressed-out” or traumatized state is for the CRN to be
stuck in a dysfunctional dynamic mode which is, in principle,
fully reversible, and is not determined by the external situation
(Levine, 1986). This suggests that (again, in principle) someone
whose CRN is fully functional will not accumulate allostatic load
in response to challenging environmental circumstances and will
thus manifest extraordinary resilience.
TRAUMA
As with “stress,” the term “trauma” is used in different ways in
different contexts. In SE, a traumatic event is defined as an event
that causes a long-term dysregulation in the autonomic and core
extrapyramidal nervous system (Levine, 1977, 1997). The impli-
cation of this is that trauma is in the nervous system and body,
and not in the event; an event that is very traumatic to one person
may not be traumatic to another, as people differ very widely in
their ability to handle various kinds of challenging situations due
FIGURE 4 | Chronic stress response. If the stressor is above a certain
intensity or duration, the sympathetic response is more intense; if there is
an inadequate defensive response, the system as a whole may fail to reset
to normal functioning, remaining “tuned” to excess sympathetic and
deficient parasympathetic activation. This state may persist indefinitely,
giving rise to a state of “chronic stress,” where the system responds
inappropriately to environmental challenge with excess activation. Note that
this is not “allostatic wear and tear,” but an altered (dys-)functional state;
such a chronic state is a major contributor to allostatic over-load. Through
appropriate intervention, the system can be returned to a normalized, fully
functional state; but without such intervention the dysfunctional state may
last indefinitely.
to different genetic makeup, early environmental challenges, and
specific trauma and attachment histories.
This view implies a continuum of stress conditions; a chronic
but mild elevation of sympathetic response at one end, and
chronic extreme activation of both sympathetic and parasympa-
thetic (or more exactly, ergotropic and trophotropic) systems at
the other. At precisely what point the stress should be regarded
as “traumatic” is less important than the understanding of the
nature of the dysregulation of the nervous system; however,
the phenomenon (demonstrated in cats by Gellhorn, 1964a) of
extreme co-activation of sympathetic and parasympathetic sys-
tems under life-threatening conditions offers a compelling model
for the freeze, collapse, and dissociation often observed in PTSD
(Nijenhuis et al., 1998b; Halvorsen, 2014); see Figure 5.
PTSD
The medical term in common use, post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), implies pathology; however SE, (which was developed
several years before the definition of PTSD in the DSM III) views
the trauma response as part of a natural, non-pathological process
that has been interrupted, and therefore prefers the term post-
traumatic stress syndrome (PTSS) (Levine, 1997). The criteria laid
out in DSM IV and V for the diagnosis of PTSD have been chal-
lenged by several authors (Shin and Handwerger, 2009; Bovin and
Marx, 2011; Scaglione and Lockwood, 2014) and impose limita-
tions not relevant to the theory of SE; most importantly, the DSM
V requires exposure to a situation which is threatening to life or
body, and limits the range of peri-traumatic emotion acceptable
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FIGURE 5 | Traumatic stress response. In the face of extreme challenge,
when either the situation is extremely threatening and overwhelms the
capacity of the organism to respond effectively, or if the response is
prevented in some way (restraint), there is first an extreme sympathetic
(ergotropic) activation with loss of vagal tone. With continued challenge,
there is a sudden intense co-activation of the parasympathetic (dorsal vagal)
system along with the sympathetic, leading to freeze, collapse or
dissociation. The ANS (and whole CRN) becomes locked into a
dysfunctional state of extremely high activation of both the sympathetic
and parasympathetic systems, and may oscillate erratically between
extremes. This may manifest as alternating depressive shutdown and
extreme anxiety or rage. This is not the result of wear and tear, but is a
specific dysfunctional state of operation of the complex dynamical system,
which through appropriate intervention can be returned to normal resilient
functioning.
for this diagnosis. Recent authors have pointed to the diversity of
various kinds of trauma, suggesting that a unitary diagnosis of
PTSD should be replaced by a spectrum of trauma-related disor-
ders (Bovin and Marx, 2011). The theories of SE might provide a
framework for such future classification.
DISCUSSION OF THESE CONCEPTS IN RELATION TO THE
CASE STUDY
Simon, the subject of the SE treatment, was exposed to a situation
he perceived as life-threatening, which triggered an emergency
(ergotropic) activation response involving the whole CRN: auto-
nomic visceral activation (ANS), immediate terror (LS), great
muscular tension (EMS), intense sensory arousal (RAS). That
evening his system began a trophotropic/parasympathetic com-
pensation (he felt teary), but he blocked that response. Crying
has been recognized as a spontaneous biological activity which
can lead to the restoration of balanced autonomic tone (Graèanin,
2014). Cortical appraisal can lead to intentional suppression of
emotional behavior or thoughts (Gellhorn, 1969; Wegner et al.,
1987; Gold and Wegner, 1995); this has been recognized as a
counterproductive, although common, strategy, and involves a
(mis-)use of cortical executive networks to interfere in the sponta-
neous self-regulatory action of the subcortical centers. The central
executive network (Szmalec et al., 2005) and the default mode
network (Raichle and Snyder, 2007), both involving the dorsal
prefrontal cortex, may be involved in this process. These networks
are both richly connected to verbal processing areas of the cortex,
and exert voluntary control based on held ideas and beliefs (Fogel,
2009); meditation and mindfulness practice have been shown to
reduce activity in these networks and instead promote activity in
the fronto-parietal network which is engaged in present-centered,
interoceptive awareness (Daprati et al., 2010). Conceptually and
verbally-mediated control may not take into account the present
emotional and physiological needs of the organism. The “mind-
ful” aspects of SE, the gentle encouragement of attention to
affective and interoceptive experience, may shift the cortex from
dorso-medially to ventro-medially controlled cortical networks
(Fogel, 2009) and facilitate spontaneous self-regulation (Herbert
and Pollatos, 2012).
Subsequently to Simon’s suppression of the tears, his system
continued to act as if the emergency situation were still present,
and normally neutral stimuli (traffic) took on a new aversive
meaning—his CRN remained in an activated state and failed to
return to baseline functioning, as a result of cortical executive
interference with the re-set process. Although the core emphasis
in SE is on restoring subcortical function, it is certainly important
to attend to faulty cortical appraisal, and this is best done through
methods reminiscent of conventional “cognitive restructuring”
(Meichenbaum et al., 2009), verbally addressing the mistaken
beliefs and appraisals.
It has been shown that the ANS is subject to both operant and
classical conditioning (Grings, 1960; Razran, 1961); a stimulus
(passing traffic) which is not inherently aversive may become cou-
pled with one that is highly aversive (an impending accident) such
that the former produces the same autonomic reactions as the lat-
ter. Simon’s description of his physical symptoms (“chronically
cold hands and feet, a knot in his stomach”) is consistent with
this view. However, unlike conventional or interoceptive expo-
sure therapies (McNally, 2007), SE is not based primarily on a
conditioning model, but rather a process model. It has been con-
clusively demonstrated that autonomic responses are subject to
classical conditioning (Razran, 1961), and while we do not doubt
that these processes play a role in stress-based dysfunction, the
stimulus/response model has long been recognized as inadequate
for explaining complex behavior. Control systems, such as the
systems involved in autonomic regulation, require feedback and
feed-forward loops which are not part of the explanatory frame-
work of conditioning theory (Haken, 1977). Although we do
not question the well-established knowledge concerning neuronal
dendritic modification in response to conditioning, the behavior
of complex neural networks are governed by higher-order prin-
ciples of dynamical systems theory (Haken, 2012). Thus, in SE,
symptoms are seen as due to a disorganized complex dynam-
ical system, rather than resulting from a simple conditioning
process (Levine, 1977). Fear conditioning extinction is the canon-
ical model for recovery from PTSD, especially through exposure
therapy (Rothbaum and Schwartz, 2002); however conditioning
theory states that, in the extinction process, a conditioned fear
response is not actually eradicated but only suppressed by com-
peting (positive) conditioned experiences (McNally, 2007); the
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implication of this, born out by experience, is that, although
fear de-conditioning is quick and effective, it is also easily dis-
rupted, as re-exposure to trauma-related cues easily reinstate the
fear response (Vervliet et al., 2013). By contrast, clinical experi-
ence in SE demonstrates a very robust change in fear responses
which are remarkably resistant to re-evocation; this is consistent
with the theory that clinical changes mediated by the SE process
are not primarily due to fear conditioning extinction but to a dis-
continuous alteration in CRN dynamical functioning; in terms
of dynamical systems theory, a shift to a different attractor basin
(Abraham et al., 1990, 1992).
Simon’s inability to have volitional control over his reactions is
also consistent with the idea that the dysfunctional ANS/CRN is
the core issue; the CRN is not normally under the direct control of
conscious volition, and is relatively unaffected by rational thought
processes (“he knows he should not be reacting this way, that it is
not rational, that after all ‘nothing really happened to him,’ but
feels completely powerless to change how he feels”; such com-
ments, in our clinical experience, are quite common). This points
to a drawback in “talk therapy” for trauma; the SE perspective is
that the CRN is most effectively addressed through interoceptive
and kinesthetic awareness.
Simon’s nervous system is now clearly dysregulated. It is
unable to return to baseline, and is oscillating between extremes
of activation (ergotropic, anxiety and rage) and shut-down
(trophotropic, depression and numbness). From the point of view
of SE, this current state of Simon’s nervous system is the relevant
fact, not the objective nature of the triggering event itself nor even
the conscious peri-traumatic experience (Simon’s experience at
the time of the traumatic event).
THE SESSIONS
Selected portions of the four SE therapy sessions are presented,
interspersed with commentary.
1ST SESSION, 1ST HALF
When Simon first came into the office, his shoulders were ele-
vated, his breathing high in his chest, his tread heavy; his face was
frowning, his jaw clamped, his eyes narrowed. I had the impres-
sion of a tense, defiant attitude; I imagined he was ready for a
confrontation, given his reaction to a prior “talk psychotherapy”
session. I greeted him, introduced myself, and offered him his
choice of chair—there were several different chairs in the room.
He seemed slightly disconcerted at being offered a choice; he
paused, looked around the room, took a deep breath, glanced
back at me, and settled purposively in the most comfortable-
appearing chair. As he shifted in the chair he looked at me again;
I imagined he might be wondering if he had taken my chair, and
could be feeling a bit defiant in anticipation of my reaction.
Me: Good choice. I think that’s the most comfortable, it’s for
the most important person here: you.
Simon: (looks at me with slight surprise, the frown lessens, he
moves in the chair again as if testing its comfort). OK.
Me: (sitting down) How does that feel?
Simon: Yeah, good, it’s comfortable, thanks. (He takes a deep
breath, closes his eyes for a moment, his shoulders drop,
his body appears to relax more into the support of the
chair. He opens his eyes again and looks at me; this is the
first time he has really looked at me).
Me: (I make brief direct eye contact with him, settling into
my own chair) Before we get started, I’d like you to
really notice how it feels in your body as you get more
comfortable in that chair. What’s that like physically?
Simon: (Moves his shoulders a little) Uh, well. . . I notice it in my
shoulders I guess. And my arms, they feel more relaxed.
(Frowns slightly as if concentrating.) I feel kind of, like
heavy I guess—a good heavy—and warmer. (Heaves a
sigh). I feel kind of relieved.
Me: OK good, relieved; and as you feel that, can you notice
any other areas of your body that feel, a bit, the same way?
Simon: (Pause, shifts his body a bit, appears to relax further;
closes his eyes) My chest feels more relaxed; and I
guess my legs feel better too, like they are resting more.
(Abruptly opens his eyes, his breathing speeds up a bit,
he tenses up a little) Shouldn’t we be talking about the
accident?
Me: (I make gentle relaxed eye contact) Yes, we will get to that
very soon, I do want to hear about it; but first, for what
we are doing here, it’s really useful for you to notice how
relaxed you can get; this will be really helpful. You know,
if you are about to climb a big mountain, you don’t just
head out dressed in a T-shirt; you first get good clothes,
boots, a guide—all the things you will need. Well, getting
in touch with good feelings in your body is like gathering
the things you need to deal with the difficult stuff later.
So. . . just noticing those relaxing feelings. . . how is that?
Simon: (his voice shifts, becomes more resonant and softer; he
moves his jaw slightly as if chewing) Good—actually I
feel really good, don’t remember when I felt this good
since the accident . . . (pause, sighs;) it’s been such a
strain. . . (his voice becomes a little throaty as if he were
about to cry, I notice slight tearing in his eyes. I recognize
sadness coming up, and I anticipate, based on his pat-
tern of “keeping it together,” that he may quickly tense
up against it, so I support this feeling).
Me: (In a soft voice) Yeah, such a strain. . . I understand. . . it’s
OK to feel that, just let yourself feel that, its fine. . . such a
relief to feel a little better. . .
Simon: Sorry, I don’t know why. . . . (Some more tears, then he
relaxes and settles, opens his eyes and looks at me; I meet
his gaze then look away, meet then avert, to show him I
am present and supportive, but not challenging him to
open up more than he already has; I am aware he could
easily feel ashamed at me seeing him so vulnerable.)
Me: Yeah. . . how are you doing now?
Simon: Wow, a lot better, feels like a big load off me. What. . . is
this normal?
Me: (I reassure him and explain some more about the SE
process; some of what I tell him is in the discussion
below. It is very useful for a client to have a clear under-
standing of the SE process, as much of it is unlike
anything else they may have experienced previously,
and is often somewhat counter-intuitive compared with
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their assumptions about what they need to do to free
themselves of trauma).
Discussion
The session begins the instant Simon walks through the door.
With the knowledge gleaned from the pre-session questionnaire
as background, I am immediately observing cues as to the state
of his nervous system, and am choosing to act in particular ways
on this basis. My initial goal therefore is to bring Simon into a
state of safety and comfort, in which his CRN is more balanced.
In SE this is known as “resourcing”; to put a person in touch with
positive inner feelings of safety, strength, comfort, and optimism,
so that they can begin to take the steps which can lead to sta-
ble restoration of balance. These are not abstract mental states
of well-being, but embodied experiences of positive feeling: an
important distinction in SE.
One of the principal ways I do this is through social engage-
ment, with the use of eye contact and voice. Porges (2007)
postulates that the ANS has three, not two, divisions. While
the sympathetic is associated with mobilization in response to
threat, the parasympathetic serves to support survival through its
two different evolutionary branches, the dorsal and ventral vagal
complexes. The evolutionarily older system, the dorsal vagal, pro-
motes shut-down and immobility, while a more recent branch,
the ventral vagal, governs social engagement. This includes the
supra-diaphragmatic vagus as well as the cranial nerves which
serve eye contact, speech, hearing and feeding behavior. Porges
suggests that the ventral vagal serves as a complex and nuanced
way of inhibiting excess sympathetic activation (“stress”) through
engaging socially with others. SE makes considerable use of this
system to promote nervous system balance. In addition to eye
contact and verbal interaction, I use whatever presents itself as
useful for putting him at ease and encouraging positive sensation–
in this case his choice of chair, though every situation is different
and it could just as well been his glance at a painting on the wall
or a certain kind of sigh. Notice that in the description I often use
the phrase “I imagine...” when describing my observation of his
inner state. This is intentional, and expresses the truth which, as
a therapist, I have to continually keep in mind: all I actually see
are certain outward behaviors; I then project what these mean in
terms of his inner state; but I could always be mistaken. So if I am
to have accurate observations, I must remember this and be ready
to change my evaluation if it is contradicted.
I am specifically guiding Simon to notice positive inner sensa-
tions as they arise. Most people, especially those who are stressed
or traumatized, tend to focus immediately on negative intero-
ceptive cues as harbingers of their distress. Damasio refers to
interoceptive cues as “somatic markers” (Damasio et al., 1996,
2000), which emerge into consciousness via the insula (the intero-
ceptive sensory cortex), and suggests they have a significant role in
contacting one’s instinctive or pre-conscious judgments about the
environment. By avoiding interoceptive cues one reduces one’s
capacity to evaluate the environment; by focusing on negative
cues only, one increases fear reactions. An important initial step
in SE is to draw the client’s attention to positive, non-aversive
somatic markers; this brings the ANS and subcortical emotional
centers into a less fearful state, as well as enhancing the connection
of the frontal cortical centers with the subcortical. Critchley
(Critchley et al., 2003, 2004; Critchley, 2013) suggests that the
insular and anterior cingulate cortices are the top level of control
for the ANS, forming a regulatory loop involving interoceptive
sensory and motor cortices, amygdala, hypothalamus, and brain
stem nuclei; one of SE’s effects may be to enhance the functioning
of this loop, thus promoting improved functioning of the subcor-
tical centers. This is accomplished by attention to interoception
rather than to cognition.
At first, the session description may seem like no more than a
relaxation induction. However, at a certain point Simon abruptly
shifts direction, tenses up, and brings his attention back to the
trauma (“Shouldn’t we be talking about the accident?”) This is an
example of a phenomenon which can also occur in meditation
or other relaxation-oriented therapies: deep relaxation may trig-
ger a sudden upwelling of aversive material (Everly and Lating,
2013); at the end of this paper we briefly suggest that the SE
perspective may offer effective ways of dealing with such diffi-
cult experiences, enhancing the therapeutic benefit of relaxation-
and mindfulness-oriented therapies. If he were to follow this
trauma-oriented impulse it would likely rapidly lead to a vicious
cycle of intense fear, sympathetic arousal, loss of clarity, intru-
sion of memories, increased distress, and a state in which further
therapeutic progress would be difficult (see Figure 6, below, for
an illustration). Yet Simon is correct: the trauma around the
accident cannot and should not be avoided indefinitely. My expla-
nation about “resource” makes sense to him and allows him to
return for a while to a subjectively pleasant state. This enables a
large, spontaneous shift: the reduced sympathetic tone allows a
parasympathetic increase, and with some more tears (Graèanin,
2014) comes a gentle sense of relief, an acknowledgment of the
strain he has been under. Had we tried to engage memories of the
accident full-on, the resultant sympathetic activation might have
blocked the possibility of this kind of gentle discharge. As it is,
he is left in a significantly more relaxed and functional state, pre-
pared to go a bit deeper in the rest of the session. This going back
and forth between charge/activation and discharge/deactivation
needs to be finely tuned. Too much of one or the other, and
the process of re-establishing balanced functioning is interrupted.
This distinguishes SE from exposure therapies, which do not tend
to avoid extremes of activation. SE terms this back and forth pro-
cess “pendulation.” When skillfully nurtured it tends to occur
spontaneously as the system seeks to restore balance (Levine,
1997, 2010).
Our view is that the subcortical systems (CRN) have intrin-
sic mechanisms for restoring inner regulation and autonomic
balance; it is the role of the SE therapist to facilitate this pro-
cess. Ongoing cortical executive suppression of behavior (crying,
tearing), thoughts or feelings is counterproductive to this spon-
taneous restorative process (Gellhorn, 1969). By creating a safe
environment and gently re-framing Simon’s interoceptive and
emotional experience, I enable him to withdraw suppressive cor-
tical control and to approach his inner experience in a graduated
(titrated) way. This reduces excess sympathetic arousal and conse-
quent suppression of frightening interoceptive experiences, which
in turn facilitates the intrinsic regulatory process of autonomic
discharge and the restoration of sympathetic-parasympathetic
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FIGURE 6 | The interaction of traumatic memory with the present
state. A present fearful or stressful state is experienced in part as
unpleasant interoceptive and proprioceptive feelings, including muscle
tension, stomach tension, trembling, weakness, constriction, increased
blood pressure (pounding pulse), decreased blood pressure (dizziness),
increased or decreased heart rate, cold sweaty hands, hyperventilation,
shallow breathing. Damasio terms these “somatic markers,” as they are
bodily experiences of emotionally and viscerally activated states,
consciously felt “markers” of subcortical states. These somatic markers
may activate memory traces that contain similar feelings. Such
trauma-related memory traces may be partly or wholly inaccessible to
ordinary conscious recollection, being procedural or implicit rather than
declarative and autobiographical. This means the person may not even be
aware that old memories are being activated. Consciously recognized or
not, the somatic markers connected to the old memories reinforce and
augment the present fearful state in a runaway positive feedback loop,
which can lead to terror, panic, rage, or shut-down. In response to these
aversive experiences (whether triggered by a present situation, conscious
memories, or implicit and procedural traumatic memories), the CRN
mobilizes a defensive response; given the circumstances, the response is
unlikely to succeed (unless carefully guided by a skilled therapist). Such
renewed failure may further disorganize the system and add to the
undischarged activation (re-traumatization).
balance. This approach can be contrasted to the more repeti-
tiously confrontative approach of exposure therapy (both conven-
tional and interoceptive) (Rothbaum and Schwartz, 2002; Wald
and Taylor, 2008); we believe SE accomplishes fear extinction
more quickly and with much less distress, probably via a dif-
ferent mechanism than that postulated for exposure therapies:
“biological completion,” as described below.
1ST SESSION, 2ND HALF
Me: OK, so let’s do something here. So what was the weather
like the morning of the incident?
Simon: Oh, the weather? Umm...I guess it was nice, yeah, a nice
day. I had no idea...
Me: (interrupting) OK Simon, see if you could just focus
on your memory of the weather when you first left the
house, before you even looked at the car! What were you
doing? Can you remember the sunshine, the tempera-
ture...?
Simon: Oh...OK...well, yeah, it was really clear, it was crisp.
Me: (noticing his breathing speed up and a slight trembling
in his hands) Hmmm, so, right now, what are you aware
of, Simon?
Simon: Well, I feel a little tense I guess...
Me: So it is just a little? Is that OK?
Simon: Yeah, not too bad... I can manage it.
Me: OK good, see if you could just allow that tension, just as
it is...what do you notice?
Simon: OK, well, my shoulders are a bit tense...I kind of feel a bit
shaky...
Me: OK, see if you can stay with that Simon, that’s fine, just
notice that little shakiness. Where do you sense that?
Simon: Yea, that’s strange, my hands are shaking...
Me: You’re doing great Simon, that’s good; just stay with your
awareness of the shaking...what happens next?
Simon: I feel the shaking spreading up my arms—this is weird–
Me: It’s OK, just see if you can be with it Simon, it’s just your
body releasing tension, just let it happen... (pause). . . and
what’s that like now?
Simon: Oh, I feel shaky all through my chest (voice thickens) I
feel a bit teary—what’s happening?
Me: You are just letting go of a bit of tension Simon, let it
happen (making eye contact).
Simon: (shakes visibly, sighs a few times, closes and opens his
eyes. Gradually the shaking subsides) Wow, that was
weird!
Me: How are you doing?
Simon: OK I guess, good. (Breathes deeply.) Fine. That was
weird!
Me: Simon, when the body gets tense it has natural ways
of shedding the tension—sometimes we cry or shake,
sometimes we yell or yawn, it’s just natural. But we are
not used to letting these things happen, so it’s unfamil-
iar. . . . So—you were telling me about the weather on that
morning....
Simon: Oh yeah...well, like I say, it was clear, crisp...I can remem-
ber my ears feeling cold, there was a bit of wind....
Me: Do you hear anything?
Simon: Well, the wind sound, the birds—some traffic in the
background....
Me: How do you feel in your body as you recall that?
Simon: Fine, I feel relaxed... hey, I just noticed that the sound of
the traffic doesn’t bother me right now!
Discussion
The second half of the first session demonstrates the core of
the methodology of SE. The first important concept is that of
“discharge.” The sympathetic nervous system mobilizes the body
for intense kinetic activity (“fight or flight”). Under normal cir-
cumstances this “biological energy” (the secretion of various
neuroendocrine substances and activation of certain neural path-
ways) is used to power intense muscular activity; when successful,
this arousal is part of a cycle involving mobilization, successful
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action, exhilaration, relaxation, and a return of the nervous sys-
tem to baseline functioning. However, under certain conditions
the ANS may get “stuck” in a state of excess activation; the mus-
cular activity does not happen or is not successful, the reciprocal
activation of the parasympathetic is not triggered by propri-
oceptive feedback, and the system does not return to balance
but continues to secrete activating neuroendocrine hormones
(Gellhorn, 1969). Gellhorn has clarified that the proprioceptive
feedback from intense muscular activity is the trigger for the
reciprocal activation of the parasympathetic (Gellhorn, 1964b).
Rats allowed to fight with each other after a stress-inducing expe-
rience recover much more quickly than rats kept separate and
thus unable to fight (Weinberg et al., 1980). Even in the absence
of this trigger, the nervous system nevertheless has ways it can
release the excess activation; this usually involves spontaneous
movement of the body (including gentle shaking and subtle pos-
tural changes), often accompanied by feelings of fear, sadness, or
relief (Levine, 2010). Drawing the client’s attention to the pro-
prioceptive and kinesthetic (somatic) markers of this “release”
process serves to enable a spontaneous re-balancing of the ner-
vous system. We have already discussed crying above; shaking and
trembling are very little referred to in the literature. There is slight
mention of trembling as a component of what has been called
“rape-induced paralysis” (Galliano et al., 1993), which is believed
to be closely related to “tonic immobility” (TI), an innate biolog-
ical reaction to extreme stress (Marx et al., 2008; Volchan et al.,
2011). From an SE point of view, this trembling or shivering is
an opportunity for therapeutic intervention; it is a sign of the
system’s attempt to begin restoring normal function. Shivering is
triggered in the pre-optic area and is associated with thermogen-
esis (Nakamura and Morrison, 2011). It helps maintain optimal
conditions for muscle function in preparation for vigorous defen-
sive activity. We speculate that the trembling observed in TI may
be a preparatory sympathetic reaction attempting to warm the
muscles in preparation for a defensive response. Encouraging this
physiological process could lead to vigorous sympathetic acti-
vation, the expression of blocked defensive reactions, and the
facilitation of a parasympathetic rebound to normal ANS func-
tion. An SE therapist would reassure the client that the shivering
is a natural process and encourage the movement to develop into
a possibly empowering response.
The second significant concept illustrated is titration. This
term is used in chemistry to describe the process where two
reagents (like a strong acid and strong base) are mixed drop
by drop to avoid the explosive reaction that would occur from
pouring them together quickly. It is also used to describe a
process of carefully and slowly introducing a new drug to deter-
mine the correct dosage for an individual. In the same way,
trauma must be approached very slowly, “drop by drop,” so
as to avoid unnecessary distress, flooding and potential re-
traumatization. Note the care with which I prevent Simon from
following his inclination to go straight to thoughts of the acci-
dent, and how we instead begin by attending to experiences
far removed from the trauma itself. Even these bring up some
degree of activation, but at an easily manageable level, such that
discharge can occur without undue distress. Once a little dis-
charge has happened, the ANS/CRN is in a somewhat more
balanced state, and Simon can then tolerate more discomfort of
arousal, discharge and further regulation and resilience in the next
go-round.
I anticipate that Simon might experience some re-activation
of the trauma during the coming week, but my expectation is
that a significant amount of the pressure has been let off, so he is
unlikely to experience a lot of distress, and I think he will return
next week with a more resilient system and well prepared for
deeper work.
2ND SESSION (PARTIAL)
Simon enters my office looking noticeably happier than last time.
His posture is more upright and he is smiling. He greets me
warmly, we shake hands, he sits again in the same seat. We make
brief direct eye contact.
Me: So, how’s it going?
Simon: On the way home I got a little freaked out by the highway
again, but I knew it was going to be OK. But, I certainly
felt a lot better.
Me: Alright, that makes sense; tell me, what were the good
feelings like after the session?
Simon: Oh, I felt really relaxed, all that tension dropped away; it
felt like such a relief. (He sighs and settles into the chair)
Me: And what are you noticing in your body while we are
sitting here talking right now?
Simon: I feel good—must be this chair! (Smiles mischievously
and laughs).
Me: So. . . let’s come back to that morning, remembering how
that was...what do you notice happening in your body as
you recall that morning?
Simon: I feel fine, no problem, I can remember that scene fine.
Me: So, where was the car? (At this point I observe Simon
carefully for the first signs of activation; I want to elicit
some activation to work with, but not so much as to lead
down the slippery slope toward overwhelm).
Simon: (calmly) In the garage.
Me: OK, so, do you remember how you got to it?
Simon: Yes, I went and lifted the garage door.
Me: OK, simply remember doing that, and notice how you
feel as you explore that image.
Simon: (still appearing relaxed) Well, I see myself opening the
garage door...I am going to the car door...I am getting in...
Me: (noticing Simon’s shoulders come up, his breathing get-
ting more rapid) OK, let’s pause for a moment. What do
you notice?
Simon: (suddenly closing his eyes, sitting forwards in the chair,
twisting his body a bit to the left, hunching his head
down; his voice sounds tight) Oh Jesus that was so scary,
I really thought I was going to die!
Me: (firmly) OK Simon, slowly begin to open your
eyes...Simon, look at me, right here. (Simon slowly opens
his eyes, at first he looks at me vacantly, his breath rapid)
You’re fine Simon, you are right here, it’s OK. Just see me,
right here. (Simon’s eyes come back into focus, his breath
slows).
Simon: Oh damn, what happened?
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Me: (in a calm voice) It’s fine, we just went a bit too quickly.
Look around the room a bit, tell me three things that you
see.
Simon: (focusing on the room, his voice calmer and slower)
OK...I see the walls...your picture there...the window...
Me: Can you feel the chair?
Simon: Yes—the magic chair! (Chuckles) That’s better!
Discussion
Despite my attempt to keep things slow, Simon slipped into the
“trauma vortex”; the memory of getting into the car triggered
an intense recollection of the accident accompanied by strong
activation of the ANS and the rest of the CRN, and I had to
act quickly to bring him back to the present so that his ner-
vous system could regain its balance. In SE one is walking the
tightrope between not enough activation, in which case there is
no discharge because there is no activation to discharge; and full-
blown reactivation of the trauma memory, in which aspects of
the trauma are relived and the person again experiences over-
whelm. This can actually be harmful, and can compound the
original trauma. Such a “dive” into the black hole, the “vortex
of trauma,” involves a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop, in
which the proprioceptive and interoceptive feedback (somatic
markers Damasio et al., 1991, 1996) from the neurally encoded
memory trace (engram), becomes a trigger for further activa-
tion (Liu et al., 2012); a runaway loop which can lead to extreme
simultaneous activation of both sympathetic and parasympa-
thetic (dorsal vagal) bringing about a dissociated state within
seconds; see Figure 6. One of the tasks of SE is to interrupt
this destructive loop. To this end, SE uses concurrent evoca-
tion of positive interoceptive experiences, which may help alter
the valence of the disturbing memories (Quirin et al., 2011);
this process has been demonstrated in rats (Redondo, 2014).
Other aspects of the mechanism whereby SE prevents the trau-
matic positive feedback loop are discussed below as “biological
completion.”
3RD SESSION (PARTIAL)
In the rest of session 2, Simon has been able to return to the mem-
ories of getting into the car, driving to the location of the accident,
and seeing the first signs of the accident about to happen (the
truck ahead of him starting to lose control). At each step he has
experienced discharge of various kinds, including shaking, crying,
and angry gestures, each time successfully returning to balance
with an increasing sense of well-being and capacity. His phobia of
driving has diminished considerably but he still has tension in his
arms. Two nights ago he woke from a nightmare drenched in cold
sweat.
After an initial greeting and check-in, we begin where we had
left off the previous session.
Me: OK Simon, if you feel ready: let’s come back again to the
moment you first saw the wheels of the truck scoot out
sideways. Can you get there?
Simon: Yes, OK, I can see that, a puff of smoke at the wheels and
they kick sideways.
Me: (Noticing a slight twisting of his body to the left and a
hunching of his shoulders forward) And what else do you
notice?
Simon: My shoulders are killing me!
Me: What is that like?
Simon: They’re on fire, they feel like they are being twisted off!
Me: And then . . . what happens now?
Simon: Oh, it’s like I have to turn the damn wheel! I can’t turn
the wheel! I’m going to die!
Me: OK Simon, just feel yourself trying to turn the wheel!
Slow it way down! You can give yourself all the time you
need, feel what your shoulders are wanting to do!
Simon: (grimaces, groans; very slowly his arms start to move)
But I couldn’t do it!
Me: But now can you let yourself do what you couldn’t do
then; give yourself all the time you need...that’s it, keep it
slow, really feel it—what you couldn’t do then, but now
you can. . . that’s it, take your time. . . .
Simon: (slowly, with the appearance of a sustained effort, com-
pletes the gesture of turning the wheel, then slowly relaxes
and heaves a huge sigh.) I did it!
Me: What happened, what did you do?
Simon: I turned the wheel even though I was afraid I couldn’t.
I got out of the way! I went right past, I could see him
behind me crashing but I was free!
Me: Great! How does all that power feel?
Simon: It feels fantastic, I feel free, my shoulders feel so light, I
don’t think I have ever felt like this!
Discussion
The SE term for this phenomenon is “biological completion.” The
ANS and affective subcortical centers are not separate from the
somatic, musculoskeletal nervous system. Indeed Panksepp’s can-
didate for the neural substrate of core self (Panksepp, 1998), the
PAG, is principally recognized as a nucleus involved in the prepa-
ration of instinctive defensive responses. Affective and ANS acti-
vation have a direct and immediate effect on the somatic system
by way of the EMS (Holstege et al., 1996; Holstege, 2013). Via the
reticular formation, the ANS and associated affective and motoric
structures change the gamma efferent supply to the muscles, alter-
ing the spinal reflexes, muscle tone, and posture in preparation
for the movements of fight or flight appropriate to the situation
(Bosma and Gellhorn, 1947; Loofbourrow and Gellhorn, 1949;
Gellhorn, 1964b). These instinctive affective-motoric (Boadella,
2005) patterned responses have developed to ensure survival;
they therefore have an extremely powerful drive to completion.
Their organizing nuclei depend partly on proprioceptive feed-
back from the somatic system to confirm successful completion
of the response (Loofbourrow and Gellhorn, 1949; Gellhorn and
Hyde, 1953). This is closely related to the phenomena observed by
Gellhorn that, absent proprioceptive feedback, the ANS does not
reset to baseline (Gellhorn, 1964b). When the survival response
is incomplete, ineffective, or prevented, the preparation for the
response may persist indefinitely unabated, resulting in continued
sympathetic, and in extreme cases concurrent parasympathetic,
activation (Gellhorn, 1967b, 1969). This results in a maladaptive
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organization of the CRN, as the precipitating situation in fact
no longer exists. This persistent maladaptation of the CRN is
the essence of the stress/trauma state. The organism is no longer
actually responding to present conditions, challenging or not,
but is locked into an unresolved state of persistent inappropriate
activation.
The view of SE is that it is possible to facilitate the comple-
tion of this biological defensive response (see Figure 7). This is
done through interoceptive and proprioceptive awareness, and
may involve imagined “playing out” of a successful resolution
of the original (unsuccessful) situation. In other words, this is
NOT re-exposure to memory of the original trauma; nor is it a
suppression of those memories and feelings. Instead it is a re-
working, on a felt subcortical level, which enables the person to
have, for the first time, an experience of successful completion of
the subcortical instinctive defensive response (Quirin et al., 2011).
The canonical animal model for PTSD is threat coupled with
restraint. Restraint alone, without threat, does not induce trauma;
nor does threat without restraint (Philbert et al., 2011). The
defensive escape response has to be prevented; only then do
trauma symptoms develop (Shors et al., 1989). Tellingly, Ledoux
found that in rats conditioned through such a procedure to a
trauma-like fear response, if they were placed in the same experi-
mental situation and allowed to complete an escape response, the
fear conditioning immediately disappeared (Amorapanth et al.,
2000).
FIGURE 7 | De-potentiation of positive feedback loop by SE. The
procedures of SE can de-potentiate the disturbing trauma-linked implicit
and procedural memories. Titration and the co-evocation of supportive and
empowering interoceptive experiences calm the extreme arousal and
facilitate accurate awareness of the interoceptive and proprioceptive cues.
The client becomes able to identify the urge toward completion of the
biological defensive response; and, in the safe and supportive context
created by the therapist, is able to complete the blocked defensive
response, through imagery and subtle movement. This will often be
accompanied by autonomic discharge in the form of heat, trembling, tears,
and so on. Once the proprioceptive experience of biological completion has
occurred, the memories lose their intense charge, and may now integrate
into the hippocampal autobiographical timeline like ordinary memories.
Now that the client’s nervous system is in a more functional state, the
client has more resilience and a greater capacity to tackle any remaining
trauma-related memories.
When the person is finally able to stay fully present to
their interoceptive and proprioceptive experience, the interrupted
movement (incomplete at the time of the trauma) can then
fulfill its meaningful course of action. This gives rise to pro-
prioceptive feedback in the nervous system that tells the ANS
that the necessary action has (finally) taken place, so that the
sympathetic system can stand down (Gellhorn, 1967b; LeDoux
and Gorman, 2001). Careful visual attention, on the part of the
therapist, can often detect the interrupted movement behind
chronic muscular tension as revealed in very small spontaneous
motions; guiding the client to slow things down and take the
time they need is essential in order that they can bring these
subtle sensations to consciousness. During the precipitating trau-
matic event, everything happens so fast that they are unable at
the time to complete the instinctive survival response; however a
fully conscious “replay” of the procedural memory of the event
can provide the opportunity for the establishment of a new set
of proprioceptive-interoceptive experiences (Mishkin et al., 1984;
Redondo, 2014). Sometime just imagining performing the move-
ments brings relief. Studies have shown that imagined movement
activates very wide areas of the brain, especially the pre-motor
areas which are strongly linked to the autonomic and emotional
centers (Decety, 1996; Fadiga et al., 1998; Oishi et al., 2000).
Procedural memory (as distinct from declarative and episodic
memory) is the memory of how to do things (Squire, 2004), such
as riding a bicycle. It is believed to be encoded in the neostriatum
rather than the hippocampus (Mishkin et al., 1984), and is not
accessible via thoughts or images but via physical sensation (pro-
prioception and kinesthesis) (Mishkin et al., 1984). SE suggests
that in a highly stressful situation, vivid procedural memories of
the incomplete innate survival actions are laid down, which later
intrude and interfere with normal functioning. The intensity of
the intrusion is due to the powerful survival imperative embedded
in the intrinsically affective content of these defensive reactions; as
long as the system does not experience completion, the survival
imperative continues to operate, and the person feels as if the sit-
uation is still happening; this of course is a well-recognized aspect
of PTSD. The SE interventions described enable the procedural
memories to complete their biological imperative and therefore
cease to intrude.
This phenomenon of biological completion is clearly related
to that described above as “discharge,” and the necessity for
a neuro-muscular (ergotropic) discharge in order to trigger a
parasympathetic “reset” (Gellhorn, 1969). This may be a par-
tial explanation for the beneficial effect of vigorous exercise on
anxiety and depression (Hötting and Röder, 2013). Our clinical
experience seems to indicate, however, that not just any mus-
cular activity will do: profound shifts seem to occur when the
activity corresponds to the movement that was interrupted in the
precipitating event. I was able to notice subtle hints of the move-
ment (of trying to turn the wheel) manifesting in Simon’s body.
Once I drew his attention to these, he was able to become aware
of the incomplete impulse; the completion of this very specific
impulse was crucial in enabling the release of the chronic muscu-
lar, autonomic and neuroendocrine activation. It is very unlikely
that ordinary voluntary vigorous exercise, even if it had used those
same muscles, would have brought about comparable results.
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4TH SESSION (PARTIAL)
By now, Simon has completed a lot of work. He has revisited most
of the traumatic memories, has experienced considerable auto-
nomic and somatic discharge, and is feeling a great deal better.
He sleeps well, is able to concentrate and drives without anxiety.
However there is still a mildly “spacy” quality to his presence, and
he acknowledges that he does not feel “fully back to myself.” I am
aware that we have not yet addressed the actual moment of the
accident, which involved violent chaotic motion of the car, out
of his control, and the certainty that he was about to die. I sus-
pect the remaining slight dissociation is related to this, and I judge
him sufficiently resilient to be able to comfortably handle this last
step.
At this point, I ask Simon to recall the first time after the acci-
dent at which he really took in that he was OK. He recalled his
first interaction with his wife at the hospital, immediately after
the accident, recounting a tearful reunion. He had assured his wife
that he was fine, exclaiming, “it was a miracle, and I’m OK!” I ask
him to notice the feeling in his body as he recalled that scene; he
describes a sense of relief, but his expression is a bit flat, without a
lot of depth, as if he were recognizing the fact of his survival, but
somehow not fully taking it in.
Then I ask him to return to the memory of the moment before
the car spun out of control.
Simon: I can feel the steering wheel like iron in my hands—I can
see the truck’s trailer ahead start to slide sideways—oh
God—(I notice his face get pale).
Me: Let’s slow down Simon. Feel the chair underneath you. . .
Simon: (orienting to me a bit) OK. . . .
Me: OK Simon, I’m going to ask you to do something here to
help slow things down—it may seem a little strange.
Simon: (still tense, but clearly curious) OK. . . .
Me: We’re going to make a sound together, like this: Voooooo
(very deep and resonant).
Simon: (smiles a little.) You want me to. . . .
Me: Together now: Vooo. . . .
Simon: (Simultaneously) Voooo..
Me: And again, feel it in your belly: Voooo. . .
Simon: (noticeably more relaxed) Vooo. . .
Me: And what do you notice?
Simon: (takes a deep breath) I can feel my legs, my lower body. . . .
Me: What is that like?
Simon: It feels good, solid. . . I can feel warmth in my legs.
Me: Good, let yourself feel that, take some time. . . now very
gently, touch on that memory again, nice and slow.
Simon: Yes. . . I can see the trailer ahead. . .
Me: And what else do you notice?
Simon: I’m gripping the wheel—the lights are so close. . .
Me: The brake lights?
Simon: Yes. . . my jaw is so tight, there’s nothing I can do, I’m so
scared. . . .
Me: Notice your jaw—what is your jaw doing?
Simon: It’s shaking, my teeth are chattering.
Me: Ok just let that happen, let your teeth chatter. . . and what
else are you noticing?
Simon: I’m shaking all over, I can’t breathe, I feel really scared.
Me: You’re doing fine, just let it happen, you are OK, it’s your
fear and all those pent up tears.
Simon: (shakes and trembles violently, breathes deeply) Oh God,
I don’t want to die!.... Oh my Lord. . . I just saw a picture!
When I was 7 I fell off my bike, I couldn’t breathe. My
dad got mad and made me get back on the bike and told
me he was proud I didn’t cry. I so much wanted to please
him, even though I was just a little kid. (Tears start to
flow freely down Simon’s cheeks as he sobs gently.) I was
so scared, so scared. . . . I think he was scared too; my dad.
I think I never really cried after that, not till just now.
Me: You’re doing great, let the shaking and tears happen, just
feel it. . . they’ve been there for such a long time. . . .
(Things settle over a few minutes. Then I notice Simon’s
body starts to gently jerk in the chair.)
Me: What happens now?
Simon: I’m losing control! It’s spinning! The car is spinning.
Me: Slow it down, let’s see if you can slow it down like you did
before. Feel it, stay with it, it’s OK.
Simon: (Gradually his body slows down, comes to rest. He is
gently trembling.) I’m alive! I’m alive! (He takes deep
spontaneous breaths.)
Me: How does that feel, to be alive?
Simon: (Continuing to sob, though now they appear to be tears
of relief and joy.) It’s wonderful! I’m alive, I can feel. I
thought I was dead, I’m alive! (Gradually the tears sub-
side, his breathing slowly returns to normal, he opens his
eyes. He has a quality of intense vitality in his gaze, a soft-
ness and aliveness through his body; he looks at me more
directly and openly than he has since he started sessions.)
Me: Yes, you are alive. You can feel the joy of being alive
through your whole body. Really feel that!
I tell him this is the natural state of his being that becomes avail-
able when there are no obstructions. I also explain to him that we
all carry many layers of obstruction from past trauma that we may
not even remember, that this opening-up is an ongoing process. I
suggest that he come in for one more appointment in a month, so
we can follow up if there are any remaining issues.
Discussion
All the key elements of SE are demonstrated here: presence,
embodied resource, titration, pendulation, discharge, and biolog-
ical completion. Simon is now sufficiently resourced, as a result
of the increased resilience of his nervous system gained through
the previous work, that he is able to tolerate, befriend and stay
fully present to the great fear of dying and the disorienting expe-
riences of being jerked around in the car. The importance of the
bodily sensations is clear: the interoceptive experience of shak-
ing and trembling, the kinesthetic/proprioceptive experiences of
being jerked around in the car. Titration is evident in the empha-
sis on slowing down; the use of the “vooo” sound helps generate
positive interoceptive sensation to support his capacity to stay
present to the extreme fear. We believe that vocalizations like
“vooo,” as well as chanting or even song, help to shift the nervous
system out of shutdown and then from a sympathetic-dominant
to a parasympathetic-dominant state. Mechanisms involved may
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include (Jerath et al., 2006; Raupach et al., 2008; Chan et al., 2010;
Busch et al., 2012; Sano et al., 2014): increased afferent signaling
from the diaphragm due to stretching by prolonged exhalation;
increased visceral afferent impulses from the abdomen due to
sound vibration; and resetting the breathing to a more parasym-
pathetic pattern by lessening CO2 loss by slowing the breath
rhythm and extending the exhalation. The deep pitch of the sound
may also play a role.
Due to Simon’s increased resilience, he does not need nearly
as much titration at this stage as he needed at the beginning. He
is able to remain present, and to become fully conscious of the
events that he had already experienced, but had not been able to
“digest” before now.
Not until he has been able to digest the experiences (and expe-
rience biological completion) is he able fully to recognize that he
has survived. In normal experience, the brain lays down a nar-
rative of life experiences in memory, which can be recalled in
sequence and are experienced as belonging to a specific time in
the past. This happens in the hippocampus. In parallel, “implicit”
memories (Roediger, 1990; Schacter et al., 1993) are laid down in
other parts of the brain, including “how-to” memories, probably
in the striatum (Reber, 2013), and emotional priming memo-
ries in the amygdala (Reber, 2013); there is also evidence that
trauma-related memories may be stored in the precuneus and
the retrosplenial cortex (Sartory et al., 2013). The trauma-related
memories may not form part of a coherent sequential timeline
(Van der Kolk and Fisler, 1995), and therefore can be experienced
as vivid sensory “flashbacks”: still present, not having receded
into the past (Sartory et al., 2013). It has been shown that stress
interferes with explicit, autobiographical memory, but not with
implicit memory (Luethi et al., 2008); and that stress-related
implicit memories can persist indefinitely, even in the absence
of conscious recollection of the precipitating situation (Packard
et al., 2014). This is believed to be at the root of the pervasive,
timeless quality of trauma-related memories (Stolorow, 2003).
Only when they have been fully assimilated and assigned to the
hippocampal timeline can they become integrated and experi-
enced as “just a memory,” in the past; and only then can one
experience oneself as being fully present. In this session, Simon’s
recovery of the memory of his father making him get back on
the bike is pivotal. Although the memory may have been acces-
sible to him prior to the session as a normal autobiographical
memory, aspects of the experience (the fear of not being able
to breathe, the pushing down of his tears in order to please his
father) were encoded as implicit and procedural traumatic mem-
ory. The car accident is “layered” on top of the earlier trauma;
the bike episode lessened his resilience and impeded his capacity
to spontaneously recover from the car accident through emo-
tional, autonomic and motor discharge. The conscious visual
and interoceptive-proprioceptive-kinesthetic recall of this memory
facilitated completion of the interrupted discharge, and enabled
a spontaneous cognitive re-evaluation of the past event (recogniz-
ing his father’s fear and the role it played in his actions). Clinical
experience in SE shows that such cognitive re-evaluations often
emerge spontaneously during or shortly after the autonomic and
kinesthetic discharges take place. We believe that the subcorti-
cal state plays a very significant role in creating and maintaining
the faulty cognitive structures, and that cognitive restructuring
happens much more easily as the CRN is restored to normal
functioning.
SOMATIC EXPERIENCING: DEFINING THE SYSTEM
When a person is exposed to overwhelming stress, threat or
injury, they develop a fixed and maladaptive procedural mem-
ory that interferes with the capacity of the nervous system to
respond flexibly and appropriately. Trauma occurs when these
implicit memories are not neutralized. The failure to restore flex-
ible responsiveness is the basis for many of the dysfunctional and
debilitating symptoms of trauma.
In response to threat and injury animals, including humans,
execute biologically based, non-conscious action patterns that
prepare them to meet the threat by defending themselves. The
very structure of trauma, including activation, freezing, dissocia-
tion, and collapse, is based on the evolution of survival behaviors
(Bolles, 1970; Nijenhuis et al., 1998a; Baldwin, 2013). When
threatened or injured, all animals draw from a “library” of possi-
ble responses. We orient, dodge, duck, stiffen, brace, retract, fight,
flee, freeze, collapse, etc. All of these coordinated responses are
somatically based–they are things that the body does to protect
and defend itself.
Animals in the wild recover spontaneously from this state;
involuntary movements, changes in breathing patterns, yawning,
shaking, and trembling, release or discharge the intense biologi-
cal arousal; these phenomena have been observed repeatedly by
one of the authors (PAL) over 45 years of clinical experience,
and confirmed through numerous anecdotal accounts by those
who work professionally with wild animals; however we have not
been able to find any significant treatment of these phenomena in
the peer-reviewed literature. In humans, a variety of factors can
thwart this “resetting” of the nervous system: fear of the discharge
process itself, prolongation of the traumatic situation, complex
cognitive and psycho-social considerations, cortical interference.
This failure to reset leaves the nervous system stuck in a dysregu-
lated state. It is when the spontaneous “reset” fails that we see lasting
post-traumatic symptoms.
The bodies of traumatized people portray “snapshots” of their
unsuccessful attempts to defend themselves in the face of threat
and injury. Trauma is a highly activated incomplete biological
response to threat, frozen in time. For example, when we pre-
pare to fight or to flee, muscles throughout our entire body
are tensed together in specific patterns of high-energy readiness.
When we are unable to complete these appropriate actions, we
fail to discharge the tremendous energy generated by our sur-
vival preparations. This energy becomes fixed (as a snapshot)
in specific patterns of neuromuscular readiness or collapse (i.e.,
mobilization or immobilization). The person then remains in
a state of acute and then chronic arousal and dysfunction in
the central nervous system. Traumatized people are not suffer-
ing from a disease in the normal sense of the word—they have
become stuck in a hyper-aroused or “shutdown” (dissociated)
state. It is difficult if not impossible to function normally under
these circumstances.
SE avoids asking clients to relive their traumatic experiences,
rather it approaches the sensations associated with trauma only
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after establishing bodily sensations associated with safety and
comfort; these become a reservoir of innate, embodied resource
to which the individual can return repeatedly as they touch, bit
by bit (titration), on the stress-associated sensations. Biological
completion and autonomic discharge occur in controlled and
manageable steps as the therapist guides the client in attending
to visceral sensation or subtle motor impulses associated with
incomplete defensive responses.
OTHER “BODYMIND” SYSTEMS
We believe that the mechanisms elucidated here explain the effec-
tiveness of traditional Asian bodymind systems as well as Western
Somatic disciplines and body-oriented psychotherapy. We also
believe these mechanisms explain the value of the emphasis on
bodily experience, breathing, posture, and balanced muscle tone
in seated mindfulness meditation, and extend current theories
about the mechanisms behind the long-term beneficial effects of
this practice.
In the practice of mindfulness meditation, as well as other
forms of contemplative practice, challenging physical and emo-
tional experiences often arise (Kaplan et al., 2012). At times these
experiences can pose significant challenges to mental and emo-
tional health, and may lead to the abandonment of the practice.
We believe that the SE perspective offers a way of understanding
and working with such issues. Although it is beyond the scope of
this paper to give an exhaustive treatment, we wish to offer some
reflections.
A painful or disturbing interoceptive or proprioceptive expe-
rience may be pointing to the necessity for some kind of “bio-
logical completion.” Simply maintaining a neutral awareness
may not lead to resolution if movement impulses and imag-
ined movements are unconsciously impeded; and many medi-
tation traditions do discourage movement. The question, “what
does it feel like my body wants to do?” can often reveal the
obstructed impulse, the completion of which may restore comfort
and ease.
During contemplative practice, a disturbing experience may
arise too intensely or too quickly, resulting in overwhelm and a
reactive suppression of the feeling. However, neither overwhelm
nor suppression are productive strategies. Temporarily diverting
awareness to a positive, safe experience, such as the support of
the ground or positive imagery, can allow one to regain inner bal-
ance; then a consciously “titrated” process of returning attention
to the disturbing experience one little bit at a time may facilitate
the assimilation of the experience.
The emphasis in mindfulness meditation on remaining
detached from discursive thought may sometimes encourage a
remote or uninvolved attitude toward arising images, feelings, and
insights. We believe that such an attitude may subtly impede the
opening-up, de-conditioning process intrinsic to meditation. SE
encourages an active, curious exploration of arising phenomena,
which is nonetheless not conceptually based. We believe that a
familiarity with this form of exploration can inform the practice
of mindfulness.
Finally, SE focuses especially on interoceptive and propriocep-
tive experiences, and puts these in a broad, meaningful frame-
work that can enable one to understand directly the meanings,
motivations and implications of such experiences. Traditional
Asian practices that emphasize bodily experience, in their full
forms, also provide such frameworks (for instance Qigong, Laya
Yoga, Tibetan Tsa-Lung practices), but these frameworks may
not be appropriate, available, or comprehensible to the Western
practitioner. SE provides a broad and sensitive framework firmly
rooted in Western scientific understanding, yet also in con-
cert with the above traditional approaches, to help guide one’s
encounters with difficult material. Moreover it does so without
diverting the practitioner into psychological analysis, which may
be a significant diversion from the intent of body-focused and
meditative practices.
SUMMARY
While trauma is a nearly ubiquitous human experience, the
manifestations of trauma-induced symptoms vary widely. When
the nervous system has become “tuned” (Gellhorn, 1967a) by
repeated exposure to long-term stress or trauma, the result is
manifest in the symptoms of PTSS. Failure to resolve PTSS can
evolve into multiple co-morbidities involving the cognitive, affec-
tive, immune, endocrine, muscular, and visceral systems. SE is
designed to direct the attention of the person to internal sensa-
tions that facilitate biological completion of thwarted responses,
thus leading to resolution of the trauma response and the creation
of new interoceptive experiences of agency and mastery (Parvizi
et al., 2013).
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